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INTRODUCTION
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein.1
Justice Jackson stated these powerful words in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.2 From 1943, when these words were
written, until today, individuals still carry the constitutional freedom to
exercise or omit from exercising certain beliefs or faiths.3 Recently,
however, the First Amendment free exercise right has been so vigorously
asserted that it is clashing with individuals’ equal protection rights.4 An
example of this tension occurred in the Supreme Court decision,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.5
Following this decision, several states, including Texas, celebrated
religious freedom and interpreted the holding to allow a stronger religious
presence in the State.6 This religious “victory” has implications on
various laws—including Texas’s House Bill 3859 (Texas’s Adoption
Bill).7 This Bill, which is now law, allows adoption agencies in Texas to
refuse services to certain individuals because of the agency’s “sincerely
held religious beliefs.”8
When analyzing the reasoning behind Masterpiece Cakeshop, coupled
with current constitutional protections, it is apparent that religious refusal
1. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
2. Id.
3. See generally U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion].”).
4. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–
24 (2018) (holding that an individual could refuse to design a cake for a same-sex couple because
his cake design was considered “speech” and, as such, constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Cruz Issues Statement in Response to Supreme Court
Decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n (June 4, 2018), https://www.cruz.
senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3859 [https://perma.cc/BX67-UV4L] [hereinafter Senator Cruz
Statement] (including Senator Ted Cruz’s celebratory messages following the Masterpiece
Cakeshop decision).
7. See generally H.B. 3859, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (perpetuating a trend within
Texas and religiously infused laws).
8. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010.
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laws—such as Texas’s Adoption Bill—are unconstitutional for several
reasons.9 This Comment will delve into the aftermath of Masterpiece
Cakeshop and how the decision affects Texas’s Adoption Bill.10 Part I
provides a brief history on religious refusals under Supreme Court
precedent and in Texas specifically.11 Part II then isolates Texas’s
Adoption Bill and describes each of its constitutional violations—
including the Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Equal
Protection Clause.12 Part III focuses on the relationship between Texas’s
Adoption Bill and the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision.13 Namely, the
section sheds light on how the Supreme Court decision does not support
religious refusal laws similar to Texas’s Adoption Bill, despite allowing
a baker to refuse to bake a cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding
celebration, as it was contrary to his religious beliefs.14 This Comment
concludes by demanding that Texas’s Adoption Bill be struck down as
unconstitutional.15

9. See id. (prohibiting certain groups of people from adopting children or from being
adopted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the establishment of religion in governmental
institutions); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971) (defining the parameters of how
far religion can permissibly be involved in state or government action).
10. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing religion to contribute to an
adoption agency’s decision to accept or refuse an application); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1720–22 (allowing a baker to refuse to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple).
11. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (describing how the legitimate
government interest in compulsory education overrides Amish religious practices); see also
Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 724 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2013) (describing a Texas case dealing
with religious freedom).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I; TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010.
13. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010; Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct.
at 1720–22.
14. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S.
Ct. at 1723 (allowing a man’s religious beliefs to be used as a premise for refusing to bake a cake
for a same-sex couple because the cake was considered to be a form of speech).
15. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (describing the protections that citizens are provided
under the First Amendment of the Constitution), with Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct.
at 1719 (expanding the scope of the First Amendment in an effort to allow a baker to refuse to
provide services to a gay couple due to the baker’s religious beliefs), and TEX. HUM. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing adoption agencies to refuse to provide services based on their First
Amendment free exercise of religion rights).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS REFUSALS
A. The Supreme Court’s Modern Approach on Religious Refusals
The Supreme Court of the United States recently examined “religious
refusals” in the context of a baker who refused to bake a wedding cake
for a same-sex marriage, as his religious beliefs opposed it.16
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. (the Bakery), is a Colorado bakery owned by
Jack Phillips (Phillips).17 Phillips was known for being a skilled baker,
as well as a devout Christian.18 Phillips explains his “main goal in life
is to be obedient to Jesus Christ and Christ’s teachings in all aspects of
his life” and he seeks to “honor God through his work at Masterpiece
Cakeshop.”19 His religious beliefs also urge that “God’s intention for
marriage from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the union
of one man and one woman.”20
In 2012, a same-sex couple, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, visited
Phillips’ well-known cake shop, the Bakery, to order a cake for their
wedding.21 Phillips refused their request because of his religious
opposition to same-sex marriage.22 Specifically, Phillips explained
“creat[ing] a wedding cake for an event that celebrates something that
directly goes against the teachings of the Bible, would . . . [be] a personal
endorsement and participation in the ceremony and relationship that they
were entering into.”23 Consequently, in September 2012, the couple filed
a discrimination complaint against the Bakery and Phillips with the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission (Colorado Commission), pursuant to
the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA).24
First, the Colorado Commission determined the Bakery’s actions
violated CADA and sent the case to a State Administrative Law Judge
16. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.
17. Id. at 1724.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1723.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1724.
24. See id. at 1725 (describing the couple’s complaint alleging they had been denied “full
and equal service” at the Bakery because of their sexual orientation); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-34-401 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in a “place of business
engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the public”).
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(ALJ) who ultimately ruled in favor of the couple.25 The Colorado
Commission further affirmed this decision and ordered Phillips to “cease
and desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples in refusing
to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they] would sell to
heterosexual couples.”26 Subsequently, Phillips appealed and the
Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission’s finding and
order.27 The Court of Appeals held that Phillips and the Bakery, as a
whole, violated CADA and requiring him to bake this couple’s cake was
not a violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion—
as he should create wedding cakes for all customers free of
discrimination.28 Specifically, the court struck down the baker’s
argument that his refusal was not because of the couple’s sexual
orientation, but, rather, opposition to same-sex marriage.29 The court
ultimately concluded same-sex marriage is almost equivalent to the
couple’s sexual orientation, and therefore Phillips and the Bakery
violated CADA when refusing to bake the couple’s cake.30
Eventually, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the baker’s
writ of certiorari and examined whether the Colorado Commission’s
order violated the Constitution.31 The Court analyzed two First
Amendment freedoms—freedom of speech and free exercise of
religion.32 In the end, the Court held in favor of the baker and concluded
that the Colorado Commission violated the baker’s free exercise rights. 33

25. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1725–26 (describing the investigator’s
findings that “on multiple occasions, [Phillips] turned away potential customers on the basis of their
sexual orientation.”); see also Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276–77 (Colo.
App. 2015) (showing the ALJ’s determination that Phillips’ actions constituted prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and not mere opposition to same-sex marriage).
26. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
27. Craig, 370 P.3d at 294–95.
28. Id. at 294; see U.S. CONST. amend I (stating “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”).
29. Craig, 370 P.3d at 279.
30. Id. at 281.
31. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
32. Id. at 1726; see U.S. CONST. amend I (stating “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . or abridging the freedom of speech”).
33. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
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Rather than solely focusing on the baker’s free exercise rights, the Court
added a freedom of speech component to its analysis.34
The Supreme Court also held that the Colorado Commission was
attacking Phillips’ individual beliefs and, therefore, was not allowing
Colorado to be religiously “neutral”—as the Free Exercise Clause
requires.35 In the end, the Court concluded the outcome of the case “must
await further elaboration in the courts.”36 In his opinion, Justice
Kennedy recognized this “further elaboration” and stated that these
disputes must be handled “with tolerance, without undue disrespect to
sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities
when they seek goods and services in an open market.”37
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court’s “general rule
that [religious and philosophical] objections do not allow business
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally
applicable public accommodations law.”38 Although Justice Ginsburg
agreed with and used the same premise as the Court, she arrived at a
different conclusion.39 In her argument, Justice Ginsburg distinguishes
several cases from Phillips’ to show how the Court reached the wrong
decision.40
Specifically, the cases Justice Ginsburg focus on revolve around a man
named William Jack (Jack) who wished to get cakes containing religious
and hateful messages.41 Jack went to three bakeries, attempting to get a
cake in the shape of a Bible, with an image of two men holding hands
covered by a red “X” and several Bible verses denouncing
homosexuality.42 Justice Ginsburg agrees that these bakeries should
34. See id. at 1728 (finding Phillips’ artistic skills in making cakes constitute “speech”
because they endorse his own voice and creativity).
35. See id. at 1729 (highlighting several moments of the Colorado Commission’s public
hearings where the Court believed members showed hostility toward any sincere religious beliefs
in the public sphere).
36. Id. at 1732.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1749–52.
41. Id. at 1749.
42. See id. (“On one cake, he requested [on] one side[,] . . . ‘God hates sin. Psalm 45:7’ and
on the opposite side of the cake ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2.’ On the second
cake, [the one] with the image of the two groomsmen covered by a red ‘X’ [Jack] requested [these
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have refused to bake cakes for Jack—not because of their religious
opposition to it, but because the messages Jack wished to put on the cakes
were hateful.43
These bakeries treated Jack in the same manner as other individuals
who wished to get cakes with hateful messages.44 Conversely, Phillips
did not refuse to bake a cake for David Mullins and Charlie Craig because
of “hateful messages,” but rather, because they were gay and wishing to
participate in a same-sex marriage.45 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
highlights the majority opinion’s mistaking religious opposition for clear
discrimination—a risk that will always prevail when allowing religious
refusals.46
B. Texas’s Approach on Religious Refusals
Following the Masterpiece Cakeshop Supreme Court decision, United
States Senator Ted Cruz found the case to be a victory and urged:
Today, the Supreme Court took a stand for religious liberty against the
unconstitutional demands of an oppressive bureaucracy. The decision’s
wide 7-2 margin shows that justices recognize what millions of Americans
have known since the first Constitutional Convention: whether a baker, a
teacher, a doctor, or clergy, the government may not force any American
to violate his sincerely held religious beliefs. I look forward to the day
when the First Amendment rights of all Americans are recognized and
reaffirmed at the Supreme Court and in every statehouse across the
nation.47

words]: ‘God loves sinners’ and on the other side ‘While we were yet sinners Christ died for us.
Romans 5:8.’”).
43. Id. at 1750.
44. See id. (“[T]he bakers would have refused to make a cake with Jack’s requested message
for any customer, regardless of his or her religion.”).
45. See id. (“The bakeries’ refusal to make Jack cakes of a kind they would not make for
any customer scarcely resembles Phillips’ refusal to serve Craig and Mullins: Phillips would not
sell to Craig and Mullins, for no reason other than their sexual orientation, a cake of the kind he
regularly sold to others.”).
46. See id. at 1750–51 (distinguishing the notion of declining to provide services because
of “offensive” messages from declining to provide services because an individual’s beliefs do not
coincide with another’s beliefs).
47. Senator Cruz Statement, supra note 6; see id. at 1732 (using several different First
Amendment protections to hold that a baker could deny baking a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple).
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Texas’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Texas is unique because it has had its own religious freedom law since
1999.48 This law—the Texas Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
(RFRA)—provides a government agency may not substantially burden a
person’s free exercise of religion.49 Further, in order for a “burdening
act” to stand up to this law, it must prove the burden is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.50 Several Supreme Court decisions and a very
similar federal RFRA, support Texas’s RFRA and provide the same
stringent strict scrutiny standard.51 Notably, when President Bill Clinton
passed the Federal RFRA in 1993, the Act stated one of its purposes was
to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner52 . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder53 . . . and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.”54 This alone provides potential dangers for “excessive
government entanglement with religion,” which both the Constitution

48. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 110.003 (describing the religion freedom law
Texas has enacted).
49. Id. § 110.003(a); see Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 724 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir.
2013) (indicating that strict compliance was necessary under the Texas RFRA).
50. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 110.003(b); Morgan, 724 F.3d at 582.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1993) (using the same compelling interest test set forth
in prior federal court rulings); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–
91 (2014) (holding that the RFRA did not allow the Department of Health and Human Services to
require corporations to provide health insurance coverage for contraceptives which were contrary
to companies’ sincerely, held religious beliefs); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (finding Wisconsin’s
compulsory school attendance law to be unduly burdensome to the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment because it forced Amish parents to send their children to public school after the eighth
grade—infringing on core Amish religious beliefs); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963)
(concluding that denying unemployment benefits to an individual who could not work on a certain
day because of her religious beliefs imposed a burden on the individual’s free exercise of religion
and, thus, was unconstitutional).
52. 374 U.S. at 406.
53. 406 U.S. at 235–36.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1993) (reiterating the need for strict scrutiny in free
exercise challenges); see also id. at 234 (finding compulsory education to the Amish to not be
“so compelling that even [their] established religious practices must give way”); Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 403 (requiring any incidental burden on an individual’s free exercise of religion to be justified
by a “compelling state interest”).
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and Supreme Court precedent prohibit.55
Several cases have illustrated these dangers and expanded the breadth
of the RFRA.56 For example, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
Hobby Lobby Corporation challenged the 2010 Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s preventative health services because Hobby
Lobby argued it was violative of the RFRA.57 Specifically, Hobby
Lobby argued that requiring it to offer access to certain contraceptive
drugs to its employees was contrary to its sincerely held religious
beliefs.58 In response, the government used the language of the RFRA
to argue the mandate served a compelling governmental interest because
it ensured all women have access to United States Food and Drug
Administration-approved methods of contraceptives.59 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held for Hobby Lobby—stating that providing access to
contraceptives did constitute a compelling governmental interest, but the
mandate did not meet the RFRA’s “least restrictive means”
requirement.60 This case is responsible for extending RFRA protections
to corporations and demonstrates how difficult it is for any law or act to
survive a RFRA challenge.61
Notably, Texas’s RFRA is still in place and has encouraged many
RFRA-related laws to make their way into the State—allowing
individuals and entities to refuse to provide goods or services to others
merely because of their “sincerely held religious beliefs.”62 Prior to the
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the establishment of religion in governmental or
state institutions); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (creating a test which asks whether a statute
in dispute fosters “excessive government entanglement with religion”).
56. See, e.g., Burwell, 573 U.S. at 688–90 (using the RFRA as a basis to use religion to
challenge the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s preventative health services).
57. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2010) (requiring employers to provide health insurance
to their employees and also provide “additional preventative care” for women).
58. Burwell, 573 U.S. at 683.
59. See id. at 727 (holding that individuals have a constitutional right to obtain
contraceptives).
60. Id. at 736.
61. See id. (permitting a corporation to use the RFRA as a basis to use religion to overcome
a government act).
62. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.004(1), 45.005(a) (allowing child welfare
agencies to permit providers to refuse to place a child with, or in the guardianship and care of, a
child welfare service if it conflicts with the provider’s “sincerely held religious beliefs”); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 2.601 (allowing clergy or any staff member of a religious institution to refuse services
to a marriage if that action violates their organization’s or individual’s “sincerely held religious
belief”).
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passage of Texas’s RFRA, a Texas case challenged the Federal RFRA.63
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Archbishop of San Antonio argued local
zoning authorities denying a church a building permit violated Texas’s
RFRA, as it imposed a substantial burden on his exercise of religion
without having a compelling state interest.64 Although not all RFRArelated legislation became law, one very controversial bill did pass and
still remains in place.65
2.

Texas’s Adoption Bill

During the 2017 legislative session, one of the RFRA bills discussed
above became law—Texas’s Adoption Bill.66 This Bill allows child
welfare organizations, including adoption and foster agencies, to turn
away qualified parents who are seeking to care for a child in need.67
These parents include LGBTQ+ couples; interfaith couples; single
parents; married couples where one prospective parent has been
previously divorced; or any other prospective parent to whom the agency
has any type of religious objection against.68 Additionally, Texas’s
Adoption Bill harms children because it allows adoption agencies to
refuse to provide services to children in care if the agency has any
religious objection to that service.69
The Adoption Bill states its legislative intent is:

63. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (striking down the Federal RFRA
as it applied to the states because the Court held that it was an unconstitutional use of the
enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment).
64. Id. at 512.
65. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (illustrating an example of RFRArelated legislation in Texas).
66. Id. §§ 45.001–.010.
67. Id. § 45.004(1).
68. See Nick Morrow, BREAKING: Discrimination Signed Into Law in Texas, Governor
Abbott Signs HB 3859, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 14, 2017), https://www.hrc.org/blog/TexasGov-signed-HB-3859-into-law [https://perma.cc/D2PB-T3WW] (outlining the numerous dangers
that Texas’s Adoption Bill will bring to a variety of communities); see generally TEX. HUM. RES.
CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing protection to agencies and failing to provide any protections
to individuals).
69. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (“A child welfare services provider may
not be required to provide any service that conflicts with the provider’s sincerely held religious
beliefs.”); see also Morrow, supra note 68 (urging that Texas’s Adoption Bill not only harms
prospective parents who want to adopt, but also harms children who belong to a class that the
agency does not agree with).
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[T]o maintain a diverse network of service providers that offer a range of
foster capacity options and that can accommodate children from various
cultural backgrounds. To that end, we expect reasonable accommodations
to be made by the state to allow people of diverse backgrounds and beliefs
to be part of meeting the needs of children in the child welfare system. 70

However, the effects of the Bill are far from the intent provided
above.71 For example, in M.D. v. Abbott, Janis Jack, a United States
District Judge for the Southern District of Texas in Corpus Christi, held
that Texas violated foster children’s’ constitutional rights by exposing
them to an unreasonable risk of harm in a system where children “often
age out of care more damaged than when they entered.”72 Moreover,
Judge Janis Jack contended this abuse from the Texas foster system has
created a “population that cannot contribute to society, and proves a
continued strain on the government through welfare, incarceration, or
otherwise.”73 This alone shows the need for reform and improvement in
the Texas foster system.74 Now, Texas’s Adoption Bill makes it even
less likely that these foster children will receive adequate care through
the foster care system or adoption.75
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEXAS’S ADOPTION BILL
A. Texas’s Adoption Bill Violates the Establishment Clause by Allowing
State Funds to be Used to Compel Foster Children Into Religious
Entities and by Supporting Religion and Not Secular Beliefs
Texas’s Adoption Bill is problematic in many ways. One of its most
troublesome characteristics is that it violates the First Amendment’s

70. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001.
71. See Kristopher Sharp, The Deadly Consequences of Texas’ HB 3859, TEX. TRIB.,
(June 23, 2017), https://www.tribtalk.org/2017/06/23/the-deadly-consequences-of-texas-hb-3859/
[https://perma.cc/3W2K-WH7G] (providing many reasons why Texas’s Adoption Bill will
continue the “cycle of abuse” in the Texas foster care system).
72. 152 F. Supp. 3d 684, 823 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
73. M.D. v. Abbott, 152 F. Supp. 3d 684, 823 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
74. See Sharp, supra note 71 (recalling the horrors the author endured while being a child
in the Texas foster care system).
75. See id. (recognizing the consequences that Texas’s Adoption Bill will have—forcing
children to spend their childhoods in facilities and being cared for by rotating staff rather than by
loving families).
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Establishment Clause.76 The Establishment Clause states: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.”77 When analyzing the Establishment Clause
in any given situation, a discussion of Lemon v. Kurtzman is necessary.78
In Lemon, the Supreme Court examined two statutes—one in
Pennsylvania and one in Rhode Island.79 On the one hand, the
Pennsylvania statute provided financial support to nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools by reimbursing the cost of teachers’ salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.80 On
the other hand, the Rhode Island statute enabled the state to directly pay
the teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of
their annual salary.81 Both statutes, however, authorized state funding
for church-related educational institutions.82
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that both statutes were
unconstitutional.83
The Pennsylvania statute was facially
unconstitutional because it allowed for state financial aid to be provided
directly to church-related schools.84 The Rhode Island statute fostered
excessive entanglement between government and religion because the
program required the government to examine a school’s records to
determine how much of the total expenditures was attributable to secular
education and how much was attributable to religious activity.85 In the
Court’s discussion, Justice Burger urged:
The language of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment is at best
opaque, particularly when compared with other portions of the
Amendment. Its authors did not simply prohibit the establishment of a

76. U.S. CONST. amend I; see generally TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010
(explaining how religious beliefs of a child welfare provider are protected even if that means
entangling church and state).
77. U.S. CONST. amend I.
78. See 403 U.S. at 602 (analyzing the circumstances of when a governmental provision is
impermissibly entangled with religion).
79. Id. at 606–07.
80. Id.; 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5601.
81. 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (repealed); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
82. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5601; 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (repealed); Lemon, 403
U.S. at 607.
83. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
84. Id. at 621–22; 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5601.
85. 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (repealed); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
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state church or a state religion, an area history shows they regarded as very
important and fraught with great dangers. Instead they commanded that
there should be “no law respecting an establishment of religion.”86

Notably, the Court moved to elaborate on how many laws “respect”
the establishment of religion without recognizing or realizing it.87 These
laws may not necessarily “establish” religion, but still “respect”
religion—and, therefore, are unconstitutional.88 Because of the
difficulty in identifying violations of the Establishment Clause, the
Supreme Court created a three-part test in Lemon.89 The tests states that
if a statute (1) has a secular legislative purpose, (2) has a principal or
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) does not
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion,” then it does
not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.90
1.

Texas’s Adoption Bill Does Not Pass the Well-Settled Lemon Test

Texas’s Adoption Bill does not pass the Lemon test referenced
above.91 Under the first part of the test, we must determine whether
Texas’s Adoption Bill has a secular legislative purpose.92 Section
45.001 of the Bill states:
[i]t is the intent of the legislature to maintain a diverse network of service
providers that offer a range of foster capacity options and that can
accommodate children from various cultural backgrounds. To that end, we
expect reasonable accommodations to be made by the state to allow people
86. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
87. See id. (“A law may be one ‘respecting’ the forbidden objective while falling short of
its total realization.”).
88. See id. (recognizing the difficulty in determining whether a statute violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); see also Establish, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) (defining “establish” as “to settle, make, or fix firmly; to enact permanently”).
89. See 403 U.S. at 612–13 (creating a test to determine the constitutionality of a statute
concerning religion); see also Robert L. Kilroy, A Lost Opportunity to Sweeten the Lemon of
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 701, 705 (1997) (providing a detailed
examination of the Lemon test).
90. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
91. See id. (providing guidance on when a statute is constitutional under the First
Amendment); see also TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (showing how the government
has allowed entanglement with religion through this provision).
92. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (detailing the way in which the first prong of the Lemon
test involves an examination of whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose).
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of diverse backgrounds and beliefs to be part of meeting the needs of
children in the child welfare system.93

When reading the legislative intent on its own, it appears to be secular
and does not promote any religious beliefs.94 Allegedly, the legislature’s
intent in enacting Texas’s Adoption Bill was to promote diversity and
accommodate children from various cultural backgrounds.95 From the
text alone, there is no basis to support a conclusion the legislative intent
was to advance religion.96 Thus, Texas’s Adoption Bill passes the first
part of the Lemon test.97
However, the Lemon test requires the statute to meet all three parts, not
just one.98 The second part of the Lemon test requires the statute to have
a principal or primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits
religion.99 Texas’s Adoption Bill does not pass this part of the test.100
Here, the foreseeable consequence is foster children will be denied
placement and services because they: follow a different religion than the
agency’s; practice no religion; or have any qualities which are against the
agency’s faith.101
Texas’s Adoption Bill also allows child welfare service providers to
use religion as a reason for denying crucial services to foster children in
need—such as denying a gay child from being adopted merely because

93. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001.
94. See id. (alleging the legislative intent to “maintain a diverse network of service
providers . . . that can accommodate children from various cultural backgrounds”).
95. See id. (providing the details of the legislature’s intent in enacting Texas’s Adoption
Bill).
96. See id. (lacking any encouragement of religion in its “legislative intent” section).
97. See id. (including a secular legislative intent of promoting diversity for both the children
and the agencies); see also 403 U.S. at 612 (requiring a statute to have a neutral purpose rather than
a secular legislative purpose).
98. See 403 U.S. at 612–13 (emphasizing the importance of meeting both prongs of the
requisite test).
99. Id. at 612.
100. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001; see id. (providing emphasis on the second part
of the test and on the consequences of the statute, rather than the statute’s intent); see also Sharp,
supra note 71 (detailing some of the chilling consequences of Texas’s Adoption Bill and how it
allows child welfare agencies to claim religious objections to certain groups of individuals).
101. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.004–.005 (allowing a child welfare agency to
decline to provide services to foster children if the children’s religious beliefs do not align with the
child welfare agency’s beliefs).
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the agency’s “sincere religious beliefs” were against it.102 This certainly
has an effect that advances religion for the agencies.103 Because the
Lemon test requires the statute in dispute meet all three elements, Texas’s
Adoption Bill would fail and be held as violative of the Establishment
Clause after the analysis of this second part of the test.104
Even if Texas’s Adoption Bill did not have principle or primary effects
advancing or inhibiting religion, it would still be held unconstitutional
because it also does not meet the third part of the Lemon test.105 The
third part of the test requires that the statute not foster “an excessive
government entanglement with religion.”106 In Lemon, the Court
evaluated this by examining the statute’s cumulative impact constituting
“government entanglement.”107
In this analysis, the Supreme Court recognizes the difficulty in having
a complete separation between church and state and knows some
government entanglement with religion inevitably may exist.108
However, a rule still exists to determine whether the government
entanglement is impermissible.109 When determining whether the
government entanglement is excessive and impermissible, courts
“examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited,

102. See id. § 45.004(1) (permitting child welfare services to “decline . . . to provide,
facilitate, or refer a person for child welfare services that conflict with, or under circumstances that
conflict with, the provider’s sincerely held religious beliefs.”); see also Sharp, supra note 71
(detailing a gay author’s experience as a child in the Texas foster care system).
103. Cf. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding that state reimbursement
for parents to pay for bus transportation to private religious schools is constitutional because it did
not only help the religious children, but helped all children).
104. See 403 U.S. at 612 (stating that a law will be held to be unconstitutional if it does not
meet all three elements of the test).
105. See id. at 613 (requiring a statute to both not advance nor inhibit religion and not foster
government entanglement with religion).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 613–14 (“[W]e conclude that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship
arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and
religion.”).
108. Id. at 614; see Sherbert, 347 U.S. at 422 ((Harlan, J., dissenting) (detailing government
entanglement with religion in the employment context)); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952) (elaborating on government entanglement in relation to religious observations at school).
109. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (specifying the test used to determine whether there is
excessive government entanglement with religion).
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the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority.” 110
Here, Texas’s Adoption Bill fosters an impermissible degree of
entanglement for several reasons.111 First, the institutions which are
benefited are solely the child welfare agencies with strong religious
beliefs.112 As mentioned earlier, the Adoption Bill’s purpose was to
promote diversity and inclusion—expressing the intent to benefit the
children.113 Unfortunately, the actual consequence of the Bill is the
exact opposite.114 Texas’s Adoption Bill fosters exclusion of certain
groups of children and harms foster children who are not of the same faith
as the adoption agency.115 Thus, the little benefit which comes from
Texas’s Adoption Bill only goes to entities of the same religious
background—therefore, encouraging government entanglement with
religion.116 Second, Texas’s Adoption Bill allows the government to use
state funds to aid one faith.117 One section of the Bill particularly
triggers this issue.118 Subsection (2) of Section 45.004 states no adverse
action may be taken against child welfare services providers if it:
provides or intends to provide children under the control, care,
guardianship, or direction of the provider with a religious education,

110. Id.
111. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010; see id. (providing the factors and tests
to determine if there is impermissible government entanglement).
112. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.004–.005 (permitting denial of services because
of any “sincere religious beliefs”).
113. See id. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing the alleged intent in enacting Texas’s Adoption
Bill).
114. See Sharp, supra note 71 (detailing the severe consequences that Texas’s Adoption
Bill brings to the foster care system and children in Texas); cf. id. (noting that the legislative intent
and the actual consequences of Texas’s Adoption Bill are different).
115. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing children of one faith to
receive benefits and children of other faiths to be left in the foster system).
116. See id. (demonstrating the way in which children who are of the same faith as the
agency are treated differently than children of a different faith).
117. See Sunnivie Brydum, Texas’ Anti-LGBT Adoption Bill is Unconstitutional and
Unnecessary, Say Texas Law Professors, RELIGION DISPATCHES (May 23, 2017), http://religion
dispatches.org/texass-anti-lgbt-adoption-bill-is-unconstitutional-and-unnecessary-say-texas-lawprofessors/ [https://perma.cc/25RS-5HCB] (detailing the effects of Texas’s Adoption Bill on
LGBTQ+ adoptions).
118. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (protecting child welfare service providers
from a cause of action for refusing child welfare services to people who do not align with the
provider’s religious beliefs).
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including through placing the children in a private or parochial school or
otherwise providing a religious education in accordance with the laws of
this state[.]119

This part of Texas’s Adoption Bill illustrates that the State is indirectly
funding religious education, not secular education, and potentially
coercing foster children to believe in certain religious principles. 120
Third, the resulting relationship between the Federal Government and the
religious authority after the enactment of Texas’s Adoption Bill is quite
simple—the government is allowing the State to provide services to foster
children of one faith and not any others.121 Additionally, the government
is allowing Texas to decline to help LGBTQ+ foster children, foster
children of no faith, and foster children who believe in faiths which are
adverse to the faith of the provider.122 Because of this, when aggregating
all of these effects together, it is apparent there is excessive and
impermissible government entanglement.123
In sum, although Texas’s Adoption Bill may survive the first part of
the Lemon test because its stated legislative purpose appears to be secular,
it fails the second and third parts of the test and is therefore, an
unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.124
2.

The Texas Adoption Bill’s “Child Welfare Service Providers” Serve as
Public Actors Under the Public Function Doctrine

Texas’s Adoption Bill attempts to mask its unconstitutional funding of
religion by stating that it is not governmental entities doing the

119. Id. § 45.004(2).
120. Id.; see Brydum, supra note 117 (explaining the potential coercion minor children may
experience as a result of religious institutions from Texas’s Adoption Bill).
121. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (failing to include a definition of
“sincere religious beliefs” in the definition section).
122. See id. (ignoring certain groups that will be harmed by the effects of Texas’s Adoption
Bill and failing to include any protection for these groups).
123. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614, 649 (finding excessive entanglement between government
and religion because of the cumulative impact the statutes brought).
124. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010; see id. at 612–14 (outlining the
parameters of each element of the test that will determine whether a regulation survives
constitutional muster).
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impermissible act, but is private child welfare providers.125 Subsection
(3) of section 45.002 of the Bill defines “child welfare services providers”
to be “a person, other than a governmental entity.”126
“Governmental entity” is further defined in the Bill to include a state
or municipality, agency of the state or municipality, or “a single source
continuum contractor in this state.”127 Notably, however, there is
currently only one single source continuum of care contractor in Texas—
ACH Child and Family Services.128 Typically, the governmental entity
involved in the adoption process and foster care in Texas is the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS). 129 Although
DFPS would not be able to discriminate under Texas’s Adoption Bill, this
does not decrease the discrimination Texas’s Adoption Bill entails and
does not shield Texas from violating the Establishment Clause.130
In 2017, Texas also passed House Bill 7, which states DFPS cannot
license individual foster families directly.131 Rather, “child welfare
providers”—the private entities mentioned in Texas’s Adoption Bill—
will now be responsible for handling all foster family licensing. 132
Therefore, because individuals are required to seek foster licenses from
these private entities and do not have any other alternatives, they are
required to face the Texas Adoption Bill’s discrimination.133
Fundamentally, this should demonstrate how Texas is truly attempting to
125. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.002(3) ( “[A] child welfare service provider’
means a person other than a governmental entity . . . .”).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 45.002(4).
128. Texas HB 3859 FAQS, LAMBDA LEGAL (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.lambdalegal.org/
hb3859 [https://perma.cc/WS6L-Q7PC].
129. See generally Child Protective Services (CPS), TEX. DEP’T OF FAM. & PROTECTIVE
SERVS., https://www.dfps.state.tx.us [https://perma.cc/5HA9-D49S] (explaining the mission of
DFPS and its role in child protective services).
130. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing non-governmental child
welfare agencies to deny services such as foster care because of the agency’s religious beliefs);
see also H.B. 7 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (denying DFPS, the main governmental child
service provider, the power to license foster families); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 615 (1991) (explaining how a private actor can begin to act as a public entity);
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (prohibiting excessive entanglement between government and religion).
131. H.B. 7 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. 65 (Tex. 2017).
132. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.002(4) (allowing entities that are not
governmental entities to use religion as a basis to discriminate).
133. See id. § 45.005 (permitting “child welfare service providers”—not governmental
entities—to discriminate).
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shield its public state actions in its Adoption Bill by inaccurately stating
that only private entities are using religion.134 As such, although Texas’s
Adoption Bill is only intended to allow private agencies in Texas to
discriminate, in practice, it is allowing all agencies in Texas to
discriminate.135
Because of this consequence, these child welfare service providers are
exercising a power which is traditionally reserved for the State and are
therefore, being converted into state actors.136 In Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., the Supreme Court considered whether a restaurant owner’s
decision to discriminate on the basis of race was unconstitutional.137
Because the restaurant owner discriminated under the compulsion of state
law, the discussion centered on whether the private restaurant owner
should be categorized as a state actor.138
The Court ultimately held that the challenging party would be able to
categorize the private restaurant owner as a state actor so long as his
discrimination was motivated by a state-enforced custom of segregating
races in public restaurants.139 In its analysis, the Court specifically
stated, “a State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private party
when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.”140
Here, Texas’s Adoption Bill is certainly compelling discriminatory
acts.141 On the Bill’s face, it seems as though only private companies
can discriminate, rather than any government or state entity.142
However, per the public function doctrine, the public entities in the Bill
are acting as public actors because the entities’ discriminatory acts are
134. See id. § 45.004 (stating that child welfare service providers are protected from adverse
action in circumstances which conflict with the provider’s sincerely held religious beliefs).
135. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 639–41 ((O’Connor. J., dissenting) (providing examples
of when a private actor’s actions can constitute State action)).
136. See id. at 627–28 (outlining the circumstances that can allow a private actor act as a
state actor); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 938–39 (1982) (requiring
“something more” to convert a private party into a “state actor”).
137. 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
138. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
139. Id. at 171.
140. Id. at 170.
141. See id. at 169–70 (converting private actors to state actors if the State compels the
private actor’s actions); see also TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (demonstrating how the
State of Texas is compelling private actors to work in a discriminatory manner).
142. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (allows entities that are not governmental
entities to use religion as a basis to discriminate).
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being motivated by a state-enforced law—Texas’s Adoption Bill.143
The Bill is a law that blatantly states that it will allow all private child
welfare providers to discriminate against any given person.144
Thus, under the public function doctrine and Adickes, the “child
welfare service providers” listed in Texas’s Adoption Bill act as state
actors and unconstitutionally use State funds as a basis to support
religion.145 Moreover, these child welfare service providers are being
encouraged by the State of Texas to continue this discrimination and
denial of services.146
3.

The Texas Adoption Bill’s Impermissible Government Entanglement is
Currently Ensuing Litigation in State and Federal Courts

Impermissible government entanglement is currently being discussed
in the case of Marouf v. Azar.147 In February 2018, a Texas couple filed
suit against the Federal Government and a Catholic non-profit
organization contracted by the government.148 The couple alleged they
were denied the opportunity to foster two refugee children because they
did not “mirror the Holy Family.”149 In the complaint, the plaintiffs sued
the religious organization and the United States Department of Health
and Human Services—alleging that these entities violated the
143. See id. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing agencies to discriminate against certain individuals
if the individual carries beliefs that are contrary to the agency’s religious beliefs); see also Lugar,
457 U.S. at 937 (listing ways through which a private actor can become a state actor).
144. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005 (failing to provide limitations on who
agencies can discriminate against).
145. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (providing a nexus test
that examines whether a private actor should be considered a State actor); see also 398 U.S. at
171–75 (asking whether the private actor’s actions were motivated by the State’s customs or laws);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 476–77 (1953) (“That it was the action in part of the election
officials charged by Texas law with the fair administration of the primaries, brings it within the
reach of the law.”); see generally id. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing an example of how a State law can
compel private actions).
146. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (permitting private actors to discriminate
against minorities, unmarried individuals, LGBTQ+ communities, specific faiths, and more);
see also Adickes, 398 U.S. at 169–71 (focusing on the State’s role in the discriminatory acts).
147. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Monetary Damages, Marouf
v. Azar (D.D.C. filed Feb. 20, 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-378) [hereinafter Marouf v. Azar Complaint]
(providing the grounds for the lawsuit of a same-sex couple in Texas who sued because they were
denied the opportunity to foster a child due to the religious beliefs of an adoption agency).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 14, 21.
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Constitution because they used religion as a premise to deny federal child
welfare services.150
This lawsuit—an example of excessive government entanglement—is
particularly relevant to the discussion of why Texas’s Adoption Bill
violates the Constitution’s Establishment Clause.151 In the lawsuit filed
by Texans, Fatma Marouf and Bryn Esplin, they allege the religious
organization that turned them down was receiving funding from the
Department of Health and Human Services and therefore, violative of the
Constitution’s Establishment Clause.152
Although the Constitution prohibits such entanglement between
government and religion, Texas’s Adoption Bill allows for it.153 In any
given case similar to Marouf, the religious agency can easily point to
Texas’s Adoption Bill as support for their actions.154 This, in itself,
illustrates how Texas’s Adoption Bill is violative of the Constitution’s
Establishment Clause.155
B. The Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause Does Not Support Texas’s
Adoption Bill
In addition to “mak[ing] no law respecting an establishment of
religion,” the Constitution also states the government shall not
“prohibit . . . the free exercise of religion.”156 Because of this, the
Supreme Court has held that the government may neither compel

150. Id. at 3.
151. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610 (prohibiting the government from using religion); see also
id. (illustrating how the government can impermissibly use religion).
152. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609 (holding that “excessive government entanglement”
includes using funding for religious reasons); see also Marouf v. Azar Complaint, supra note 147
at 7–8 (portraying an example of a child welfare agency who received funding from the government
and subsequently used this funding to support its religious beliefs).
153. See U.S. CONST. amend I. (prohibiting the establishment of religion in Government);
see also HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing government agencies—which are funded
by the taxpayers of Texas—to impermissibly use religion when accepting or denying adoption
applications).
154. Marouf v. Azar Complaint, supra note 147 at 10; see TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§§ 45.001–.010 (failing to require an adoption agency to have a real reason for denying any couple
the right to foster—so long as the reason is related to a sincerely held religious belief).
155. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing religion to be used by a
state actor when deciding who can and cannot adopt or foster a child); see also Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 610 (prohibiting the entanglement of government and religion).
156. U.S. CONST. amend I.
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affirmation of a repugnant belief,157 nor penalize or discriminate against
individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the
authorities,158 nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination
of particular religious groups.159
In the Congressional Members’ amicus curiae brief, the members
argued the Masterpiece Cakeshop case brought a unique free exercise
issue—“an attempt by the government, not to prohibit action motivated
by religion, but to coerce a message or action that violates the actor’s
religious conscience.”160 This perspective is also applicable to the case
at hand because here, in creating Texas’s Adoption Bill, the legislature
could argue that before the existence of this Bill, agencies were being
coerced to take actions that were contrary to their religious
conscience.161
Several cases have examined this perspective—coercing individuals to
practice something which is contrary to their religious beliefs.162 For
example, in Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court examined the “subtle
coercive pressure” to participate in a public school graduation featuring
public prayer.163 In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy clarified that
both of “[t]he First Amendment’s Religion Clauses mean that religious
beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed
or prescribed by the State.”164 Thus, when a state seeks to subject
“freedom of conscience [to] subtle coercive pressure, both religious
clauses come into play.”165 Consequentially, the Court held the
graduation ceremony’s procedures violated the First Amendment, even
157. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
158. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69–70 (1953).
159. Follet v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 582 (1944).
160. Brief for United States Senators and Representatives as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 31, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1742
(2018) [hereinafter Congressional Members Amicus Curiae]; see generally Elane Photography,
LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (illustrating an
attempt by the government to prohibit action motivated by religion).
161. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (strengthening adoption agencies’
“free exercise of religion” rights by allowing the agencies to use religion as a broad basis for
denying other individuals their rights).
162. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (refusing to force a student to
participate in a school prayer at graduation).
163. Id. at 588.
164. Id. at 589.
165. Id. at 592.
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though the subtle coercive pressures to attend were applied to all students
and were both neutral and generally applicable.166
When applying this analysis to Texas’s Adoption Bill, it is clear that if
the State attempts to justify the Bill with the Free Exercise Clause, this
argument will fail.167 First, these child welfare agencies provide
essential services to children in need and, by providing those services,
those children are not being coerced into believing any religious
beliefs.168 This, in itself, is drastically different than an individual being
forced to pray if they want to attend a graduation ceremony.169
A student who has worked hard to succeed in school has the desire to
attend their graduation ceremony at the end of their studies. 170
According to the Free Exercise Clause, the Constitution provides that
students should not be forced to pray if it is contrary to their own religious
or secular beliefs.171 Analogously, when a child welfare agency is
allowing foster parents to adopt a child, the religious views of the agency,
foster parents, and child are irrelevant.172 Just because an agency of
Christian faith allows a Muslim couple to adopt a child does not mean the
Christian agency is now being “coerced” into following a faith contrary
to their own.173 Coercion involves compulsion by threat or force—
neither of which take place when ordinary adoptions involving multiple
faiths occur.174 This distinguishes Texas’s Adoption Bill from other free
166. Id. at 588.
167. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (failing to respect both of the
religious clauses within the First Amendment).
168. Compare id. § 45.004 (using “sincere religious beliefs” in a non-religious context),
with Lee, 505 U.S. at 588–89 (holding that individuals were being coerced into participating in
prayers at a graduation ceremony).
169. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (lacking any text that coerces
an agency to have the same beliefs as the potential parents of a child), with Lee, 505 U.S. at
588–89 (describing a situation where students were forced to participate in religious activities).
170. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590 (providing a narrative of a student faced with a dilemma of
not wanting to follow a religious faith while being at school).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see id. at 599 (stating that a school cannot persuade or compel
a student to participate in a religious exercise); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 (prohibiting the
Government from penalizing or discriminating against individuals or groups because they hold
religious views abhorrent to the authorities).
172. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (lacking any text that coerces an
agency to have the same beliefs as the potential parents of child).
173. See id. § 45.005 (allowing an agency to preserve its own beliefs).
174. See Coerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“To compel by force or
threat”).
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exercise cases which allow religious refusals because of the risk of
coercion.175
The Free Exercise Clause also concerns the longstanding principle that
one should not have to choose between government benefits and religious
beliefs—as illustrated in Sherbert v. Verner, McDaniel v. Paty, and
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer.176 First, in Sherbert,
the Supreme Court held that an individual should not have a forced choice
between receiving unemployment benefits and following their faith. 177
Second, in McDaniel, the Court examined a forced choice between public
office and faith.178 Third, in the recent case of Trinity Lutheran Church
of Columbia, the Court analyzed the issue of forced choice when a church
was denied a grant because of its religious affiliation.179 In each of these
cases, the Court held that it is unconstitutional to require religious
believers to choose between faith and public participation.180
When analogizing these cases to Texas’s Adoption Bill, it is apparent
the Bill also includes the unconstitutional notion of a “forced choice.” 181
Under Texas’s Adoption Bill, potential parents who have religious beliefs
contrary to that of the agency must choose between a) adopting a child or

175. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (failing to coerce any agency
to believe something contrary to their own beliefs), with Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (coercing
individuals to believe in something contrary to their own beliefs).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–22 (2017) (holding that a church’s
rights were violated under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by denying the Church
an otherwise available public benefit on account of its religious status); 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)
(holding a clergy-disqualification provision unconstitutional because the State conditioned the
exercise of religion on the surrender of the ability to hold public office); 374 U.S. at 404 (showing
that forcing an individual to choose between following the precepts of their religion and forfeiting
benefits is unconstitutional).
177. 374 U.S. at 404.
178. 435 U.S. at 621.
179. 137 S. Ct. at 2014.
180. See id. at 2021–22 (holding that a church cannot be forced to choose between
participating in a benefit program or remaining a religious institution); McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626
(holding a clergy-disqualification provision unconstitutional because of the conditions and
requirements the State imposed); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (detailing how forcing an individual to
choose between following the precepts of their religion and forfeiting benefits is unconstitutional).
181. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (requiring one to choose between
adopting a child or following their faith), with Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (requiring one to choose
between receiving unemployment benefits or following their faith).
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b) following their beliefs.182 This is the same forced choice present in
Sherbert, McDaniel, and Trinity Lutheran.183
Additionally, Texas’s Adoption Bill will fail the “neutral and generally
applicable” test.184 This is important because the Supreme Court has
held that under the First Amendment, “neutral, generally applicable laws
may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a
compelling governmental interest.”185 Although Texas’s Adoption Bill
may be “neutral,” as it is not targeting a specific faith or favoring a
specific faith, it is not “generally applicable.”186 The Bill is not
“generally applicable” because it only targets individuals who express
religious beliefs or identities contrary to the agencies’ beliefs.187 Thus,
Texas’s Adoption Bill should not be upheld under any free exercise
justifications.188
C. Texas’s Adoption Bill Constitutes Discrimination in Violation
of the Equal Protection Clause
Once a right is deemed to be fundamental, courts must respect this right
and guarantee all individuals are afforded the freedom to exercise that
right.189 In Shapiro v. Thompson, Justice Brennan concurred with the
majority opinion stating:
182. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (requiring certain parents to make difficult
decisions when deciding whether or not to adopt or foster a child).
183. See 137 S. Ct. at 2021–22 (“The . . . policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It may
participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious institution.”); 435 U.S.
at 626 (holding that under the law, McDaniel “cannot exercise both rights simultaneously because
the State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other”); 374 U.S. at 404 (“The
ruling forces her to choose between following the percepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits,
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work.”) .
184. See generally Burwell, 573 U.S. at 694, 739 (upholding neutral and generally
applicable laws).
185. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514.
186. See id. (requiring laws to be neutral and generally applicable in order to be held as
constitutional).
187. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (favoring religion rather than neutrality);
see also id. at 514, 537 (defining a “neutral” law to neither approve nor disapprove of religion).
188. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (describing that just as an individual must comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability that proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes), so must a state bill).
189. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 620
(1969) (expounding the need to respect fundamental rights to all citizens).
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[t]he Court today does not “pick out particular human activities,
characterize them as ‘fundamental,’ and give them added protection . . .”
To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established
constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the
Constitution itself demands.190

In an equal protection analysis, the first question is whether the
applicable law operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class or impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution.191 If the law does not, then the inquiry ends there.192
However, if the law does impinge upon a fundamental right, then a
reviewing court must determine whether the law furthers a legitimate,
articulated purpose.193
1.

Texas’s Adoption Bill Impinges Upon Numerous Fundamental Rights
and Therefore Does Not Trigger the Lenient Rational Basis Review

In the context of Texas’s Adoption Bill, we must apply the first prong
of the test by asking whether this Bill operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right that is explicitly or
implicitly protected by the Constitution.194 This first prong itself
consists of two parts: the first focusing on the “suspect class” and the
second focusing on the deprivation of a fundamental right.195 The first
part has common ground in Supreme Court precedent. 196 In San Antonio

190. 394 U.S. at 620.
191. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 20–22 (providing examples of “suspect classes” in equal protection
jurisprudence); see also, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (striking a Texas filingfee requirement in primary elections because it barred potential candidates who were unable to pay
the fee); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971) (striking a law that did not provide
indigent prisoners with the basic rights of an adequate defense or appeal); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
395, 397–98 (1971) (invalidating a law imposing criminal penalties on indigents who could not pay
a fine); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243–44 (1970) (striking down criminal penalties that
placed indigents in prison because of their inability to pay a monetary fine); Gardner v. California,
393 U.S. 367, 370–71 (1969) (holding that a law which denied a transcript of a hearing to an
indigent to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
357–58 (1963) (invalidating a law that denied counsel on appeal to an indigent defendant); Draper
v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499–500 (1963) (refuting a law that denied the indigent a transcript
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Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court mentioned that the
individuals who are typically discriminated against in equal protection
cases typically share two specific characteristics:
because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some
desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit. 197

Here, both characteristics are met.198 In Rodriguez, the Court
examined these characteristics in determining whether an equal
protection violation occurred in a suit where parents sued on behalf of
their minority-grouped school children in Texas.199 The parents argued
their children were not provided with equal protection of the laws because
they were not receiving the same educational opportunities that other
children in Texas were receiving, as their low-property taxes
inadequately funded the schools.200 Because of this, the parents argued
the Texas school finance system was unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.201
In the end, the Court held that the Texas system did not operate to the
particular disadvantage of any suspect class.202 Additionally, the Court
held education was not a fundamental right or liberty.203 Because no
fundamental right was involved, the Court instead used a rational basis
test, rather than strict scrutiny, and ultimately held that Texas’s school
financing system does have a rational relationship to some legitimate
Therefore, the system was found to be
state purpose.204
205
constitutional.

to their hearing); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (striking state laws that prevented an
indigent defendant from receiving a transcript during his trial and appeal process).
197. 411 U.S. at 20.
198. Id. at 17 (providing two common characteristics that typical “suspect classes” have in
equal protection analysis).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 4–6, 8 (describing the issue of whether the Texas school finance system
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class).
201. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend XIV (requiring states to provide equal protection of the
law to all citizens).
202. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 54–55.
203. Id. at 35, 37.
204. Id. at 55.
205. Id.
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Unlike Rodriguez, Texas’s Adoption Bill infringes upon a fundamental
right.206 Highlighting this fact emphasizes the unconstitutionality of
Texas’s Adoption Bill.207 This distinction affects the validity of the law
because it establishes the standard which will be used to determine the
constitutionality of the law.208
When non-fundamental rights are at stake, like in Rodriguez, a rational
basis test applies.209 Under a rational basis analysis, the law in dispute
will almost always be constitutional.210 This lenient test demonstrates
“[a] statutory discrimination . . . [will not] be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived [by the Court] to justify it.”211 Conversely,
as explored in more detail below, when the Court applies a strict scrutiny
test, the challenged law is presumed to be invalid.212
2.

Texas’s Adoption Bill Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny

A strict scrutiny test diametrically opposes rational basis review—as
statutes rarely survive the test.213 A law can only survive strict scrutiny
if it is narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate government objective. 214
Here, because Texas’s Adoption Bill infringes upon a fundamental right
206. See id. at 33 (evaluating the constitutionality of a regulation that affected the nonfundamental right to bear arms in the public sphere).
207. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.51
(1977) (reiterating the right to adopt as equivalent to the fundamental right of biological parents);
compare id. at 35 (dealing with a non-fundamental right) (emphasis added), with TEX. HUM. RES.
CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (describing a proposed bill noticeably infringing upon individuals’
fundamental right to adopt).
208. Compare Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446–47 (1972) (requiring a rational basis
test to be used for non-fundamental rights), with Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375–76
(1971) (requiring strict scrutiny to be used for fundamental rights).
209. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–320 (1993) (requiring a rational basis standard
of review to be used when non-fundamental rights are being triggered); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447
n.7 (reiterating the need for a lenient rational basis test when non-fundamental rights are being
examined).
210. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–20 (reflecting the presumption a law will be constitutional
under a rational basis analysis); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 54–55 (finding Texas’s
school financing system to be constitutional because there was some rational relationship to a
legitimate State purpose).
211. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
212. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 61 (Stewart, J., concurring).
213. See id. at 16–17 (reflecting on the presumption of invalidity that statutes will have
when going through a strict scrutiny analysis); see also Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–20 (describing the
presumption of validity under rational basis review).
214. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 16–17.
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rather than a non-fundamental right, strict scrutiny will be used rather
than rational basis.215 For example, strict scrutiny was used in
fundamental right cases dealing with privacy.216 In those cases, the
Court recognized the right to privacy to be a fundamental right; thus, any
possible infringement upon that right required a rigid strict scrutiny
analysis.217
The only time a rational basis test is applicable is when nonfundamental rights are in dispute.218 In Rodriguez, the Court was clear
to hold that the right to education was not a fundamental right, which is
what led the Court to use rational basis rather than strict scrutiny.219 This
distinction is crucial for the equal protection analysis for Texas’s
Adoption Bill because the applicable test will determine the outcome of
the Bill’s constitutionality.220
Because the right to adoption is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny
must be applied.221 Adoption is a fundamental right and “the legal
equivalent of biological parenthood.”222 Therefore, any law which
creates categorical barriers based on criteria such as the potential adoptive
parent’s marital status, sexual orientation, age, religion, race, or ethnicity
is presumptively unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny approach. 223

215. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53, 155–56, 170 (1973) (using a strict scrutiny
standard when a fundamental right was involved).
216. See, e.g., id. (using a strict scrutiny test to determine whether an abortion law was
constitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding a law within the zone
of privacy must withstand strict scrutiny); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (using
strict scrutiny in a fundamental right case on privacy).
217. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53, 155–56, 170; see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding a law
concerning the zone of privacy must stand against strict scrutiny); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541
(“[It is the Court’s] view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential.”).
218. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–20 (understanding fundamental rights of the mentally
challenged); see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 17, 35, 40 (using a rational basis
test because there is no fundamental right to education).
219. 411 U.S. at 35, 37, 40.
220. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005 (2017) (involving fundamental rights such
as: the right to adopt, the right to raise your family as you see fit, the right to privacy); see also id.
at 16–17 (providing the applicable test for constitutional challenges when fundamental rights are at
stake).
221. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 843–44 (holding that adoption is a fundamental right); see also
Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (requiring a strict scrutiny test when evaluating fundamental rights).
222. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.
223. See id. (stating that adoption is a fundamental right).
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Restrictive laws—such as Texas’s Adoption Bill—must be given the
same strict scrutiny and examination of means and ends as other laws
which place categorical burdens on entry into and recognition of
fundamental family relationships.224
Strict scrutiny requires the law to be the least restrictive means to meet
a compelling governmental interest.225 Moreover, this test has been
known as the “most rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional
review.”226 When applying this standard to Texas’s Adoption Bill, it is
clear it does not survive constitutional muster.227
First, there is no indicated “compelling governmental interest.”228 As
mentioned above, the “purpose” listed in Texas’s Adoption Bill is to
“promote diversity and inclusion.”229 However, the actual terms of the
Bill do not achieve this purpose and therefore, this cannot be a compelling
governmental interest.230 If there were any actual “governmental
interests” for this Bill, it would contain something along the lines of
promoting religion—which is clearly unconstitutional.231 Second, even
if the State did assert a compelling governmental interest for enacting
Texas’s Adoption Bill, the procedures in the Bill are certainly not
narrowly tailored nor the “least restrictive means” of achieving any

224. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.004–.005 (2017) (allowing child welfare
services providers to discriminate against same-sex couples due to the services’ sincerely held
religious beliefs); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (describing the way in
which laws that trigger fundamental rights rarely survive constitutional muster).
225. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385–86 (stating that regulations regarding fundamental rights
can be imposed so long as they are the least restrictive for that fundamental right).
226. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (noting that,
when strict scrutiny applies, legislation is presumptively invalid); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (detailing the constitutionality of electoral redistricting).
227. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (2017) (taking a highly burdensome
approach in allegedly attempting to achieve a state interest); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 155
(requiring laws that trigger fundamental rights to be the least restrictive means in achieving a state
interest).
228. See generally TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001 (2017) (lacking any compelling
governmental interest in its purpose).
229. Id.
230. See id. §§ 45.001–.010 (stating its purpose of the Bill to be “diversity and inclusion”);
see also TEX. DEP’T OF FAM. & PROTECTIVE SERVS., supra note 129 (stating that nearly half a
million children live in foster care in the United States).
231. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (indicating that “excessive government entanglement”
with religion is unconstitutional).
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governmental purpose.232 Therefore, Texas’s Adoption Bill cannot
survive constitutional muster and must be stricken as unconstitutional. 233
In addition to not surviving strict scrutiny, the “common
characteristics” test, which Justice Powell mentioned in the Rodriguez
decision, further emphasizes the unconstitutionality of Texas’s Adoption
Bill.234 These two common characteristics are 1) “because of their
impecunity, [class members are] . . . completely unable to pay for some
desired benefit,” and because of this, 2) “they sustained an absolute
deprivation of meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”235 Here,
the “suspect class” is the group of individuals who are now not able to
practice their fundamental right to adopt.236
In Rodriguez, the Court defined the “typical indicia of
suspectness.”237 The typical classification is “saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”238 Here, the most obvious group of individuals who will be
harmed by Texas’s Adoption Bill is the LGBTQ+ community.239
However, this is not to say that the Bill’s harm is limited to these
individuals.240 Yet, it is clear many faith-based adoption agencies will
have “sincerely held religious beliefs” that do not coincide with the
LGBTQ+ communities’ beliefs.241

232. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.009(d) (taking a highly burdensome approach
that infringes on numerous individual rights).
233. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (requiring a regulation or law to pass strict scrutiny in
order for it to be held as constitutional).
234. See 411 U.S. at 20 (defining two common characteristics that all suspect classes in
equal protection cases have in common).
235. Id.
236. Cf. id. at 28 (defining what the traditional “suspect class” typically is).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Marouf v. Azar Complaint, supra note 147 at 15 (providing an example of how the
LGBTQ+ community is affected by Texas’s Adoption Bill).
240. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing discrimination against any
group under a “religious exception”).
241. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (illustrating a situation where
an individual used his religious beliefs to refuse to bake a cake for a LGBTQ+ couple); see also
Elane Photography, LLC, 309 P.3d at 53 (denying photography services to an LGBTQ+ couple
because of religious beliefs).
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEXAS’S ADOPTION BILL
AND MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP
As mentioned earlier, after the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision, many
conservatives praised the ruling and saw it as a victory for religious
refusals.242 Certain parties interpreted the case to expand religious
protections and allow businesses to use their religious beliefs to deny
services to individuals.243 However, the analysis of Masterpiece
Cakeshop reveals that the decision does not support religious refusals in
all contexts—and specifically does not support the constitutionality of
religiously infused laws such as Texas’s Adoption Bill.244
A. Although Designing a Wedding Cake May be Protected First
Amendment Speech, Denying Services to Foster Children is Not
Protected Speech
In deciding Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court focused on several
crucial factors such as Baker Phillips’ mastery at designing cakes and
how he considered his cakes to be protected speech under the First
Amendment.245 Because his speech was considered to be his art, it was
protected—allowing him to decline to create his art for whomever he
wished.246
In fact, leading up to the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision, several
United States Senators and Representatives submitted an amicus curiae

242. See 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (arguing the Baker’s decision was an exercise of his freedom of
speech and freedom of religion); see also Senator Cruz Statement, supra note 6 (claiming the
Court’s decision denied an oppressive bureaucracy the opportunity to trample religious liberty).
243. See Senator Cruz Statement, supra note 6 (“The decision’s wide 7–2 margin shows
that the justices recognize what millions of Americans have known since the first Constitutional
Convention: whether a baker, a teacher, a doctor, or clergy, the government may not force any
Americans to violate his sincerely held religious beliefs.”); see also Todd Ruger, Lawmakers Add
to the Mix in the Same-Sex Wedding Cake Case, ROLL CALL (Dec. 5, 2017, 5:01 AM),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/same-sex-wedding-cake [https://perma.cc/8PVR-QE8E]
(explaining the political views on Masterpiece Cakeshop prior to its ruling).
244. See Emma Platoff, What the U.S. Supreme Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision
Means for Religious Refusal Laws in Texas, TEX. TRIB. (June 5, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/05/us-supreme-court-masterpiece-cakeshop-gay-rulingreligious-freedom-tex/ [https://perma.cc/4SVE-X4BA] (describing the potential chilling and
discriminatory effects that the Masterpiece Cakeshop holding could have on Texas).
245. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1728.
246. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020

33

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 22 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3

298

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 22:265

brief on this issue.247 In the brief, the Senators focused on the Free
Speech component and argued “Phillips’ artistry on a celebratory custom
wedding cake is protected First Amendment speech.”248 Because
Phillips’ speech is protected, the Senators argued strict scrutiny should
apply, and Colorado’s restrictions of Phillips’ speech fails under this
standard.249
When determining whether conduct is considered “protected speech”
under the First Amendment, the first inquiry is whether the conduct is
expressive.250 Courts determine whether conduct is expressive by
examining whether the speech is “intended to be communicative” or “in
context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be
communicative.”251 If the speech is expressive, then the Constitution
protects it by limiting the government’s authority to restrict or compel
it.252
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the petitioners argued that Phillips’ creation
of custom wedding cakes for individuals was expressive.253 The Court
agreed with the petitioners’ contention and held that Phillips expressed
himself by creating and designing custom wedding cakes.254 Because
Phillips’ cakes were considered art, Colorado’s public accommodations
law was “alter[ing] the expressive content” of his message, as it forced
him to create custom wedding cakes for same-sex weddings.255 The
247. See Congressional Members Amicus Curiae, supra note 160 at 31 (arguing that the
Government is trying to “coerce a message or action that violates the actor’s religious conscience”).
248. Id. at 7.
249. Id. at 23.
250. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (“Expression,
whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner
restrictions.”).
251. Id. at 294.
252. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1742.
253. See id. (detailing the reasons why Baker Phillips was considered an “artist” and his
cakes were his “art”).
254. Compare id. at 1743 (providing that “the use of his artistic talents to create a wellrecognized symbol that celebrates the beginning of a marriage” is protected speech), with Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (holding nude dancing to be unprotected
speech), and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (reasoning the display of red flags
as an opposition to government to be unprotected speech).
255. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1743–44; see COLO REV. STAT.
§ 24-34-601 (2014) (prohibiting discrimination in a wide range of public spaces). But see Hurley
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995) (deciding
“provisions like these . . . [to be] well within the State’s usual power to enact when a legislature
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Court ended its analysis by reiterating “[t]he meaning of expressive
conduct . . . depends on ‘the context in which it occur[s].’”256
In the context of Texas’s Adoption Bill, the religious refusal analysis
will differ greatly from the Masterpiece Cakeshop analysis.257 In
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Phillips’ speech was protected because his cakes
were a form of expression and because he was selling them as goods to
other individuals.258 However, Texas’s Adoption Bill does not deal with
selling goods or services and does not deal with freedom of expression in
any shape or form.259 Rather, it deals with foster children in need of
homes, couples seeking to adopt children, agencies being able to deny
these potential parents their right to adopt, and agencies denying the
foster children an adequate home.260
B. Purchasing Cakes is Not a Fundamental Right, but Freedom of
Personal Choice in Matters of Marriage and Family Life is
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, when the same-sex couple was denied a
wedding cake, they were not deprived of a fundamental right.261 If the
baker’s decision barred them from getting married, then the couple would
have been deprived of a fundamental right; however, that was not the
case.262 David Mullins and Charlie Craig were still able to get married
if they desired to—they were just required to purchase the cake from a
different baker.263 Thus, in the end, they were not deprived of a
“fundamental right,” which is part of the reasoning behind the Court’s
decision to ultimately permit the baker’s conduct.264

has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, as they do not, as a general
matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments”).
256. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1744.
257. Compare id. at 1727–28 (examining religious refusals in the context of selling goods
and services), with TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005 (allowing religious refusals in the context
of providing homes to foster children in need).
258. 138 S. Ct. at 1742.
259. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a).
260. See id. (permitting religious refusals by non-governmental agencies in the context of
providing homes to foster children in need).
261. See 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (denying the couple the opportunity to purchase a cake).
262. Id.; see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (holding same-sex couples
have a fundamental right to marry).
263. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
264. Id.
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The circumstances surrounding Texas’s Adoption Bill are quite
different.265 For one, certain classes of individuals will be deprived of a
fundamental right—the right to have freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life.266 This discussion began in 1923 in
Meyer v. Nebraska when the Court declared:
Without doubt, [constitutionally protected liberty] denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restrain but also the right of the individual . . . to
marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.267

After this case, the Supreme Court continued to examine the extent of
fundamental rights with regard to marriage and children.268 This
examination soon led to the modern adaptation of the right to privacy.269
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court struck down a state ban
on the use of contraceptives because of “the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.”270 This expanding right to
privacy brought a new set of fundamental freedoms:271 the right to
265. Compare id. at 1732 (allowing a baker to refuse to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding
celebration), with TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (allowing adoption agencies to refuse
to allow particular classes of individuals to adopt children).
266. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (permitting agencies to refuse to provide
services to certain classes of individuals); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
539–40 (1977) (declaring freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life to be
an implicit fundamental right); Ashe McGovern, Texas House Passes Bill Allowing Adoption
Agencies to Turn Away Same-Sex Couples, SLATE: OUTWARD (May 10, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/05/10/texas_house_passes_bill_letting_adoption_agen
cies_turn_away_same_sex_couples.html [https://perma.cc/RT9W-MGDF] (providing potential
harmful consequences of Texas’s Adoption Bill).
267. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
268. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race.”); see generally Joseph A. Pull, Questioning the
Fundamental Right to Marry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 24–33 (2006) (exploring the parameters of
non-textual constitutional protection for marriage).
269. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (granting married individuals a constitutional right
to prevent conception).
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 498–99 (finding an ordinance to violate constitutional
due process protections because it intruded upon family sanctity); Smith, 431 U.S. at 845 (“The
individual’s freedom to marry and reproduce is ‘older than the Bill of Rights.’” (citing Griswold,
381 U.S. at 486)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“[T]his Court
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Roe, 410
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marry,272 to procreate,273 to avoid procreation,274 to rear children,275
and to cohabit with family members.276
Included in these “family privacy” rights should be the right to
adoption.277 Although many recent cases examine these familial rights,
the origins of these rights stem from early 1920s cases.278 The Court’s
emphasis on familial rights throughout history until present day further
emphasizes the fact that no individual should be deprived of this right. 279
Similar to the right to marriage and the right to privacy, adoption is a
fundamental right.280 The Court has held that adoption is “the legal
equivalent of biological parenthood” and has also held that a child has a
fundamental right to basic family relationships.281
It is important to note the broad range of familial relationships which
Texas’s Adoption Bill affects.282 As discussed throughout this
Comment, Texas’s Adoption Bill permits Texas child welfare service
programs to refuse services to certain individuals.283 Notably, Section
45.002 of the Adoption Bill itself defines “child welfare services” to
mean:
U.S. at 152–53 (“Only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty’ are included in this guarantee of personal privacy . . . [This personal privacy]
right has some extension to activities relation to marriage.” (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (declaring
marriage to be a constitutional liberty protected by the Due Process Clause).
272. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384–85; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
273. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–42.
274. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849
(1992) (“[T]he Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s most basic
decisions about family and parenthood.”); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (listing factors women
may consider when deciding to continue their pregnancy); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (extending
privacy rights to protect access to contraceptives).
275. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (acknowledging that “the rights to
conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed “essential”).
276. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–06.
277. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.
278. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Court could
not prevent a child from attending a private school); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397 (holding that
the Court could not prevent children from learning a foreign language).
279. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 842.
280. Id. at 844.
281. Id. at 844 n. 51.
282. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing broad definitions for the
term “child welfare providers”).
283. Id. § 45.005.
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social services provided to or on behalf of children, including: A) assisting
abused or neglected children; B) counseling children or parents; C)
promoting foster parenting; D) providing foster homes, general residential
operations, residential care, adoptive homes, group homes, or temporary
group shelters for children; E) recruiting foster parents; F) placing children
in foster homes; G) licensing foster homes; H) promoting adoption or
recruiting adoptive parents; I) assisting adoptions or supporting adoptive
families; J) performing or assisting home studies; K) assisting kinship
guardianships or kinship caregivers; L) providing family preservation
services; M) providing family support services; N) providing temporary
family reunification services; O) placing children in adoptive homes; and
P) serving as a foster parent.284

The length and breadth of this list illustrates the wide range of familial
relationships that Texas’s House Bill disturbs.285 This list also signifies
the broad range of constitutional violations that follow with the Bill. 286
Further, the list demonstrates how the Bill’s usage of “child welfare
services” does not only cover services provided to children—therefore,
expanding the types of providers that can utilize this law to discriminate
without receiving adverse action.287
Therefore, Texas’s Adoption Bill places a wide array of fundamental
rights at stake.288 Because of this, if the Supreme Court were to examine
the constitutionality of Texas’s Adoption Bill today, it would take a very
different approach than it did in Masterpiece Cakeshop.289 First, it
would certainly use a strict scrutiny analysis.290 As discussed in the
284. Id. § 45.002(3).
285. See id. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing a laundry list of familial services that Texas’s
Adoption Bill will affect); cf. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844 (holding that an individual has a fundamental
right to basic family relationships).
286. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (discriminating in many aspects of
familial relationships); cf. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843 (recognizing the family as being of foundational
importance to our society).
287. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (affecting both children and potential
parents’ fundamental rights).
288. See id. (exposing numerous vulnerable communities to discrimination); see also Smith,
431 U.S. at 842 (emphasizing the importance of familial relationships and the fundamental rights
placed within these relationships).
289. See 138 S. Ct. at 1728 (providing a narrow and specific solution to the baker and samesex couple under a Free Speech analysis).
290. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (violating individuals’ fundamental
rights); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (requiring strict scrutiny to be used anytime a fundamental
right is triggered).
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equal protection analysis above, strict scrutiny is the appropriate test in
cases involving fundamental rights.291 Here, the fundamental rights of
adoption, privacy, marriage, freedom to raise a family as you deem fit,
and more are triggered in Texas’s Adoption Bill.292
This Comment previously demonstrated how Texas’s Adoption Bill
will not survive a strict scrutiny test because it is not the least restrictive
way the State can achieve any compelling governmental interest.293 It is
important to reiterate this point when comparing the breadth of rights that
Texas’s Adoption Bill reaches in comparison to the constitutional
violations involved in Masterpiece Cakeshop.294 While Masterpiece
Cakeshop extends protections to the discriminatory behavior of
individual business owners, Texas’s Adoption Bill subjects thousands of
potential parents, children, and families to the personally held religious
views of government employees and agents.295 Therefore, the narrow
holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop cannot be interpreted as support for
laws which allow religious belief-based refusals, laws such as Texas’s
Adoption Bill.296
C. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court Relies on Precedent
Similar Facts to Texas’s Adoption Bill When Coming to its
Conclusion
Notably, in the Masterpiece Cakeshop analysis, the Court cited an
established case that examined the clash between religious beliefs and

291. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 17 (imposing the rigorous strict scrutiny
test on any regulation or law that burdens a fundamental right).
292. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (targeting a wide array of
fundamental rights).
293. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (defining the specifics of a strict scrutiny analysis).
294. Compare 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24 (denying David Mullins and Charlie Craig the
opportunity to purchase a wedding cake from Baker Jack Phillips in Colorado), with TEX. HUM.
RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (denying any potential parent or child any type of child welfare
service from private agencies in Texas).
295. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing adoption agencies in
Texas to discriminate against anyone who wants to adopt or foster a child), with 138 S. Ct. at 1727
(allowing business owners to refuse to bake a cake or create art).
296. See 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (“The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must
await further elaboration in the courts . . . recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons
to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”).
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discriminatory conduct.297 While the Court emphasized the importance
of the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause in its analysis of the issues, it
also stated:
Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections are
protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally
applicable public accommodation law.298

When making this statement, the Court cited the well-known case of
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.299 In Newman, the Supreme
Court upheld the Fourth Circuit ruling that five South Carolina barbecue
chain restaurants violated the public accommodations law in the Civil
Rights Act of 1961 by refusing to serve African American customers. 300
The district court in Newman stated that it “refuse[d] to lend credence or
support to [the defendant’s] position that he has a constitutional right to
refuse to serve members of the Negro race in his business establishments
upon the ground that to do so would violate his sacred religious
beliefs.”301
In Justice Winter’s concurrence, he agreed with the district court and
stated that the defendant should be subject to sanctions for the frivolous
nature of such an argument in the face of overwhelming jurisprudence
which supported the Civil Rights Act overcoming such a claim.302 Just
as the plaintiffs in Newman had a public accommodation law to protect
them from discrimination,303 those discriminated against because of the
Texas’s Adoption Bill have a similar basis for protection—the United
States Constitution.

297. Compare id. at 1727 (citing precedent relating to a business owner’s desire to deny
services to a group of individuals because of his religious beliefs), with TEX. HUM. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing child welfare services to deny services to certain individuals
because of the agencies religious beliefs).
298. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
299. Id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per
curiam)).
300. 377 F.2d 433, 434 (1967).
301. 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (1966).
302. Newman, 377 F.2d at 438.
303. Id. at 434.
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The fact that the Supreme Court cited this case fifty years later, in
another case which presented a very similar situation, shows that the
Supreme Court was cognizant of the harms religious refusals bring.304
The Court was cautious in holding a baker could refuse to bake a cake for
a same-sex couple, but the Court did not characterize this as a “religious
refusal” or undermine constitutional grounds that separate religion from
law.305
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has left a gray area for religious refusals.306 In
contexts such as Texas’s Adoption Bill—where First Amendment free
exercise rights are so vigorously protected they cause discrimination—
this grey area is largely apparent.307 Although many interpreted
Masterpiece Cakeshop as a victory for religious refusals, it is not.308 The
decision provided a narrow holding which essentially reiterated Free
Speech principles in the context of designing a cake for a same-sex couple
in Colorado.309 Now, however, the Supreme Court is at a point where it
needs to clarify the untouched parts of the Masterpiece Cakeshop
case.310 Until the Supreme Court ultimately decides these specific issues
of discrimination, all that is clear is the unconstitutionality of religiously

304. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (concluding with the importance
of judicial neutrality, tolerance, and respect when resolving discrimination disputes).
305. See id. (holding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not exercise its power
“with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires”).
306. See e.g., id. at 1727–29, 1732 (acknowledging the discrimination the baker exercised
against the same-sex couple and upholding the legality of anti-discrimination public
accommodation laws; but allowing the baker’s actions to go unpunished due to the religiously
“unneutral” manner in which the State handled the case).
307. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (attempting to allow child welfare
agencies to practice their free exercise rights); see also Marouf v. Azar Complaint, supra note 147
at 3 (providing an example of a same-sex couple who were harmed by the effects of Texas’s
Adoption Bill).
308. See Rodney W. Harrell, State Religious Free-Exercise Defenses to Nondiscrimination
Laws: Still Relevant After Masterpiece Cakeshop, 87 UMKC L. REV. 297, 314–15 (2019)
(elaborating on the narrow holding of the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision and describing how it
was unintended to support religious refusals).
309. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
310. See id. (“Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples
cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”).
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infused laws such as Texas’s Adoption Bill.311 Texas’s Adoption Bill is
highly distinguishable from religious refusal incidents such as
Masterpiece Cakeshop and is violative of both the Establishment Clause
and Equal Protection Clause.312 As such, Texas’s Adoption Bill should
be stricken as unconstitutional.313

311. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing sincerely held
religious beliefs to infringe on the Constitutionally protected rights of others); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 26-6-36–48 (2017) (allowing child-placement agencies to deny services based on a “sincerelyheld religious belief or moral conviction” and protecting child-placement agencies from religious
discrimination by the State but not providing prospective parents or the children with the same
discriminatory protection); Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination
Act, Ch. 334, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-62-1–19 (2019) (legitimizing and allowing religious
organization, parties to foster care, medical providers, commercial sales and service entities, and
government employees to discriminate based on three religious beliefs or moral convictions:
1) marriage is only between a man and a woman; 2) sexual relations are reserved to marriage; and
3) gender is determined at birth and is immutable).
312. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (reaching beyond the typical
free exercise protections and in turn violating numerous constitutional rights of private citizens who
are involved in the Texas foster care system), with 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (holding that private business
owners accused of discrimination in violation with public accommodation laws are “entitled to a
neutral decisionmaker who [will] give full and fair consideration to [the accused] religious
objection”).
313. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (infringing on numerous fundamental
rights of vulnerable communities throughout Texas).
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